Choi Hyung-guk's Essays (16) Doing One's Best in the Given Environment

Everyone faces different circumstances. And those circumstances are always changing. Problems arise when one cannot adapt to change or forcibly tries to create change. In that process, the most important thing is to mind one's heart and cultivate unwavering resolve (恒心). When the wind blows, we sway; when it rains, we get wet. But when the sunshine returns, we open our arms to welcome it.

The military is the place that must best understand such change. If the enemy's tactics change but one fails to understand them, proper combat becomes impossible. The Imjin War of 1592 is a prime example. From the early days of the kingdom, the Joseon military identified the Jurchen people to the north as their primary enemy and built their tactical organization around cavalry as a countermeasure. During King Sejong's reign, when establishing the Four Garrisons and Six Forts and dreaming of territorial expansion, they also conducted operations using cavalry-centered Five Guard Formation tactics (五衛陣法).

Even when the Three Ports Incursions (三浦倭亂), including the 乙卯倭變, occurred, the Joseon military defended with cavalry as their main force. Indeed, when the Japanese pirates disembarked on land after arriving by boat, it was efficient for cavalry to pursue them quickly and defeat small units individually.

However, the Imjin War was different. Both its scale and duration were fundamentally different from the small conflicts of the past. More than 100,000 Japanese troops spread out from Busan across such vast territories of Joseon that the entire land was engulfed in war. General Shin Lip (申砬), who commanded the Battle of Tangjin River after abandoning Cheongryeong Pass, committed everything to cavalry tactics and could only meet a tragic death.

During the Imjin War, Japan utilized muskets (火銃), personal firearms, as ranged weapons, and deployed Japanese swords and long spears in close combat, attempting new warfare tactics (戰法) to break Joseon's cavalry tactics. As a result, the capital fell in just under 20 days after landing, the Gyeongbokgung Palace burned, and King Seonjo had to flee to Pyongyang.

The Martial Training Command (訓鍊都監), which we learned about in Korean history classes in school, was also an organization hastily created to overcome these tactical limitations. The new tactics employed by this unit involved the Three-Class Soldier system (三手兵體制)—training musketeers (砲手), archers (射手), and spear-and-sword soldiers (殺手) together. Provincial armies were also converted to the Three-Class Soldier system under the name Sookoggun (束伍軍), bringing about tactical changes.

However, the infantry-centered tactical changes made to counter the Japanese were disrupted again after the Second Manchu Invasion of Korea (病子胡亂). The Qing maintained a cavalry tactical system centered on rapid mobile warfare rather than close-quarters combat. Indeed, one decisive reason King Injo became isolated in Namhansanseong Fortress was the inability to cope with the rapid southward movement of Qing cavalry vanguards. He had intended to flee to Ganghwa Island, but Qing cavalry had already advanced to what is now the Bulgwang-dong area of Seoul. Thus he hastily fled in the opposite direction, toward Namhansanseong Fortress.

The Joseon military had to supplement cavalry tactics once more. This was the practical reason why six types of mounted martial arts, including spear techniques (기창) and horseback cudgel techniques (마상편곤), were added to the martial arts manual Muye Dobo Tongji (武藝圖譜通志), compiled during King Jeongjo's reign. In a given environment, one must constantly prepare and change oneself to survive.

The same applies to martial arts training. First and foremost is maintaining one's physical condition to face an opponent at any time. Then, within that physical stability, one analyzes the opponent's movements, adds unceasing practice, and ultimately finds peace of mind.

In the contents of the Muye Dobo Tongji, there is a passage from a letter that Lee Deok-mu (李德懋) wrote to King Jeongjo:

"It is said that a lion plays with a ball, rolling about, tumbling and somersaulting all day without rest. Whether catching an elephant or catching a rabbit, it expends full strength—this is due to the same unceasing drive as playing with a ball. The Japanese, when at leisure, place a straw pillow-like object before their rooms and grasp a wooden sword (木刀), striking it whenever they have the chance to train their techniques and methods—how could they not attain wonderful sword-wielding skill?"

A fierce lion rolling about with a ball all day is not mere play. Through such play, it regulates its breathing, strengthens muscles and joints, and can expend full strength in actual hunting. Thus martial arts training develops into play, and play is modernized into sport. Conversely, competitive play develops into systematic hand-to-hand combat (權法). The essence of all this is to maintain unwavering resolve, find joy, and free the body.

Particularly, the passage emphasized that the Japanese, when at leisure, practice refined swordsmanship by striking a straw pillow with wooden swords. The sharp sword techniques of the Japanese military during the Imjin War were perfected in this manner. Historical records even mention that soldiers of the Joseon army could not even draw their swords from their scabbards before being slaughtered on the spot.

"Being prepared prevents misfortune" (有備無患) need not be accepted only as grand discourse like the "Ten Million Soldiers Doctrine" (十萬養兵說) that Yulgok Yi I spoke of. One must start from the battlefield, pouring one's utmost sincerity into every downward strike and kick, beginning to unfold it from within one's own body. For modern militaries, whether it is a small bullet fired from a small rifle or a heavy shell fired through a tank cannon, one must concentrate all one's attention and train accordingly. These small efforts accumulate to stabilize martial preparedness (武備).

Yet there are many occasions where people debate the question like "which came first, the chicken or the egg?" Simply put, it is the logic that good results only come when a good training environment is provided first. There is some merit to this argument. But how can all environments be optimal? It can be more efficient to slowly improve the given environment and create the best of it, however slow the progress may be.

In the Mencius (孟子), such a passage appears. Duke Wen of Teng (滕文公) asks, "The people of Qi intend to build walls on the land of Xue (薛). I am very afraid. What should I do?" (滕文公問曰, "齊人將築薛, 吾甚恐, 如之何則可") Xue was a small territory that Qi forcibly occupied, and the fact that Qi was building walls facing toward nearby Teng caused great anxiety. The meaning is that a hostile nation is building new fortifications directed at one's own country to cultivate military strength, which is frustrating.

In the next section, Mencius brings up an old story and provides relevant advice. And concludes like this: "Do no more than strive to do good" (彊爲善而已矣).

In other words, one has no choice but to do one's utmost. The situation is already unfolding, and if one cannot change the given environment oneself, there is only one answer. It is to do one's very best with sincere effort within that environment. The outcome thereafter is determined by heaven alone.